Introduction
High executive pay and its alleged lack of connection with underlying company performance continues to receive widespread media attention. Despite the e¤orts of public policy which came mainly in the form of recommendations on corporate governance in the Cadbury Report (Cadbury 1992 ) and the Greenbury Report (Greenbury 1995) with the objective of bringing in line the interests of company executives with that of shareholders, a clear empirical pay-performance relationship in the UK remains elusive. An important development following the publication of the Cadbury report was a better disclosure of information on executive pay in the companies annual reports and also the establishment of special remuneration committees for setting executive pay. Yet, the empirical literature on the pay-performance puzzle that followed those new government guidelines still remained inconclusive. Indeed, studies which were able to disaggregate total pay in the form of xed salary, bonus and share options found a signicant but weak relationship between the variable component of pay and various accounting measures (see for example (McKnight and Tomkins 1999) , (McKinght 1996) , (Main, Bruce and Buck 1996) ). In contrast, studies which use a narrower denition of pay nd a weaker relationship with pay and accounting measures such as, shareholder-return and earnings-per-share which are of interest to the shareholder ( (Main, Bruce and Buck 1996) , (Gregg, Machin and Symanski 1992) ). (Conyon 1997) and (Conyon and Leech 1994 ) nd a statistically signicant but economically weak relationship between pay and performance. The US literature nds that most of the incentive e¤ects of total pay occur through share options, but total incentive e¤ects are su¢ciently small that an additional unit of prot for the company leads to only about 0.3% increase in CEO pay (see in particular (Jensen and Murphy 1990 ) and the literature review in (Murphy 1999)).
There has been a general consensus that the Cadbury Report did not go far enough in making companies disclose more information on executive pay. Amongst other things, (Conyon, Gregg and Machin 1995 ) make a strong case for full disclosure in the public domain of information on various pay types and they also argue for the disclosure of targets or benchmarks which companies use to reward executives. The very recent addition to the government guidelines relating to executive-pay called The Directors Remuneration Report Regulation 2002 covers more ground on information disclosure in that it establishes a new section in the companies annual reports called The Remuneration Report which contain all the necessary information on executives rewards and any targets or conditions related to those awards. This paper aims to assess this new information.
The latest annual reports published by the rst half of 2003 contain a new chapter on executive remuneration with explicit information on pay. Indeed, a detailed list of award types, their levels and the conditions for obtaining awards and also the members of the remuneration committee (remcom hereafter) and their salaries are all reported. Using this new information we approach the payperformance issue from a di¤erent angle.
Indeed, while the majority of the literature on pay-performance relationship is concerned with levels of pay and their connection with company performance, our objective in this paper is to examine conditions that are targeted by the remcoms and we put to test the viability of those conditions. In the rst instance we discuss the types of targets remcoms use to incentivize their executives. We then concentrate on share-options which is an instrument that is commonly used to provide incentive for executives to improve the long-term performance. Interestingly, 60% of the rms in our sample use conditions for the vesting of share options that are common across companies. This performance condition is the achievement of a certain accumulated growth in earnings-per-share over three years that would make the share options award exercisable.
This common use of earnings per share targets is due to the inuence of successive generations of Association of British Industries (ABI) guidelines which among other things recommend the use of earnings per share growth targets. The 2001 ABI guidelines restrict most options with a value of up to four times earnings provided there are earnings per share (EPS) targets relative to a peer group or a benchmark over a three year period. The ABI guidelines also allow for options up to eight times earnings provided that EPS targets are in the upper quartile of FTSE100. Main (2002) analyses the ABI guidelines in a stylized model. He nds that in some cases particularly onerous performance conditions associated with the eight times earnings case actually lead to a weaker relationship between pay and performance because these conditions are quite unlikely to be met. This paper takes an alternative approach and uses actual remuneration data and analyst forecasts to assess how di¢cult performance conditions are in practice and how they relate to economic fundamentals. We also assess how wide crosscompany di¤erences are in the toughness of performance conditions.
The intuition for there to be di¤erences in results is straightforward. The remcoms set the required target of accumulated growth in EPS and interestingly it di¤ers by rm but even if the EPS target did not di¤er by rm, the volatility of EPS growth di¤ers that will cause the strength of the targets to di¤er as well. The fact that there can be some variance of performance targets that does not depend closely on our remuneration data, because performance targets are based on means and do not take into account variances, their impact can vary dramatically across companies unless o¤setting parameters are adjusted. We illustrate this basic point with a model in Section 2. However, in practice we nd that there is not that large a di¤erence in how di¢cult performance targets are to achieve. This may mean that companies use other information in addition to expected growth rates in setting performance targets.
In Section 3 we turn to our remuneration report data and subsequently in Section 4 caculate the probabilities of meeting the growth target in EPS for measuring the toughness of targets set by the remcoms. We use analysts forecast for EPS and company-specic historical surprises in EPS to extrapolate these probabilities. We then nd the relationship of our toughness-of-target measure with the fundamentals of the companies. We nd two noticeable results. First that the current targets chosen by the remcom are such that the executives in our sample, on average, have a 45% chance of satisfying the target. Second, the toughness of the targets was found to be only weakly related to governance variables and other fundamentals. Both our ndings suggest there is still some room for improvement in the design of targets by remcoms.
In Section 5 we augment the model to account for selection bias using the (Heckman 1979) procedure. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
A Simple Model and Intuition
In this section we illustrate the basic features of performance conditions based on EPS growth in which earnings per share growth varies across companies. For illustrative purposes it is useful to assume normality of EPS growth. The probability that EPS-growth, , exceeds the target EPS-growth, ,is assuming normality:
where, , ¹ denote the standard normal variable, the accumulated nominal growth in EPS over the three years targeted by the remcoms, the expected growth over three years and the standard deviation in EPS growth respectively. Typical targeted nominal EPS-growth over three years are the sum of the three-year expected ination and the three-year accumulated real EPS growth chosen by the remcoms(see Table1) and have the form: = 3 (ination) + 3(Real growth in EPS set by remcoms)
where we assume that expected ination to be 2.5% per annum. The probabilities and therefore the toughness of targets in Eq. (1) are exactly a function of in Eq. (2) and therefore and ¹ and not just inuence the di¢culty of meeting targets. But and ¹ vary considerably across rms! Consider two rms: one with of 0.26 then the probability of meeting the target is roughly 40% whereas if of 0.038 then the probability is over 48%. These values of indeed correspond to 20th and 80th percentiles of the companies in our sample. And indeed our more detailed analysis below will conrm that there is not that much variation in probabilities of meeting targets.
Data and Sources
The primary data has been gathered from two accounting sources. The rst source is the latest (or 2002-2003) remuneration reports in the annual reports of 130 of Britains largest companies. Some company reports were published in December 2002 and others in March 2003. From this source we gathered data on the main focus of this study that is on the conditions which remcom set for achieving short and long term awards. By short-term awards we mean the yearly bonus and by long-term award we mean the share-options which typically vest after three years once the vesting conditions are met. The remuneration reports also provide data on the composition of the remuneration committee, the salary of each member of the committee, the people who attend the remcom meetings and those who provide them with advice. We also collect data on the notice periods for the executives and the tenure of the current CEO. The second source is information from Reuters where we nd information on the included companies. More specically, we use average analyst forecasts for two years into the future of various accounting measures and also information on over and underpredictions of the various accounting measures for the latest accounting period and also the year before that.
The companies sampled are from the FTSE100 on 10/07/03. We also included in our analysis 30 more companies which originate from FTSE 350 in 19/08/03. We chose these 30 companies to enhance our sample to improve the statistical analyses. The additional 30 companies which were selected to be part of the sample are companies which are among the largest companies outside the FTSE100 and also have share targets used by remcoms to incentivize long-term pay that are similar to the EPS targets used by over half (53) of FTSE100 companies. Table 1 provides descriptive information on those 83 companies that use pure EPS targets in our sample of 130 companies. There are a few noticeable points. First, the base salaries do not have any incentives attached to them. All the remcoms report that the base salary is chosen on the basis of the size of the company and salaries proposed by the competing companies. Second, the target variables used for incentivizing short-term rewards ( i.e., the bonus) were only listed in remuneration reports without eluding to the exact nature of those conditions. For example, the majority of the remuneration reports state that the directors have to achieve personal objectives set by the remcom and some other objectives in terms of growth in prots and other accounting variables to achieve the bonus. What those personal objectives are, and the exact levels of growth in accounting-measures which will satisfy the remcom, are not reported. Third, share-options were the only reward on which extensive information has been made available. Indeed, the levels of awards granted each year and the exact nature of the performance conditions required for the vesting of options after three years are discussed in detail. It turns out that the remcoms of 53 companies in FTSE100 set conditions which exclusively target average cumulative real growth in EPS over three years. For example in Table 1 , the average growth in EPS in excess of ination required by remcoms over three years for 82 companies with pure earnings per share target is 6% with a maximum of 30% and a minimum of 0%. This detailed information on share-options allows us to measure the toughness of this performance condition and whether it is correlated with other fundamentals of the company. Share-options are not the only tool that are used to incentivize for the long term. About half of FTSE100 rms use awards in the form of performance shares. However, these are usually subject to multiple conditions making their inclusion in our sample trickier. Consequently, we concentrate on rms which use share-options with a common target so that our results have comparability and homogeneity.
Turning now our attention to the second source of data, we use data on analysts forecast on EPS for two years following the publication of the annual reports i.e. for 2003 and 2004 . Along with these we require the data on expectational errors in EPS that is the extent to which average forecasts of EPS deviated with the average values reached for 2002. We used data on the expectational errors (denoted as historical surprises in Table 2 ) for 2001 from Reuters. This data will the basis for estimating the toughness of conditions for vesting of share-options across rms. In Table 2 we present the summary statistics on the data on EPS. In Table 2 we report summary statistics of forecasts on the levels and the growth in EPS and historical expectational errors over the past two years for 130 companies. The histrocial surprises are computed as the percentage di¤erence there is between the average analysts EPS level (growth) estimate and the actual EPS level (growth) at end of a given period.
Modelling Strategy
With the available information on share option designs, we concentrate on estimating the toughness of the conditions set by the remcoms. As explained previously, the performance conditions for share options are set out for three years at the end of which the remcom compares actual performance with the performance required by the preset conditions. We estimate the toughness of conditions by extrapolating the probabilities in three years of achieving conditions set by remcom. Lower probabilities of hitting the target would imply that conditions are challenging given current information. Once we have estimated the probabilities, we try to explain them by correlating them with various company characteristics in a series of regression analyses.
To recall from above (Eqs. 1 2 3) , the probability that EPS-growth, , exceeds the target EPS-growth, is:
In order to compute the probabilities we need to compute all the parameters in Equations (4). We have already presented in Equation (3) the formula for computing the targeted nominal EPS-growth over three years, i.e.,
We now discuss the computation of the remaining parameters Firstly, Equations (6) show our estimations of the expected cumulative growth in EPS over the 3 years, ¹ , after which options may become exercisable.
We consider two ways of computing the expected growth in EPS. The rst two involve analysts mean forecasts of nominal growth in EPS. The third involves analysts median forecasts. Lets examine each in turn.
To calculate the cumulative growth over three years we need to compute the growth in EPS that would occur in the three years after the date of the grant of the share options. Suppose that the option was granted in year, we proxy the growth in EPS the rst year, i.e. + 1, by taking the average of the highest and the lowest growth in EPS forecasted by analysts for period + 1, we call this 1. Growth in EPS for period + 2 is proxied by the taking the average of the highest and the lowest EPS-growth forecasted by the analysts for the second year, 2 The growth forecast for the third year, 3 is not available, as a result we proxy it by either taking the average growth forecasts of the previous two years or by assuming that growth in the third year would be the same as the forecasted growth in year two (these are given by the rst two equations in (6). The second way of estimating expected growth is by looking at the forecast median growth by the analyst for the rst two years,( 1 and 2) and then using an average of these median growths for the nal year, 3. Irrespective of how we compute the expected growth for each of the three years, the computation for the expected cumulative growth in EPS is done by computing the geometric average of the growth in EPS as in Eq. (6) It turns out that the choice of our measure for cumulative growth does not a¤ect our results since the correlations between, are all close to 0.95. The second parameter we need to estimate is which is the standard deviation of EPS-growth for the company. Using the portfolio theory approach we start by assuming that the variance of a rms EPS-Growth is composed of two components: a variance that is rm specic (idiosyncratic) and another that is non-idiosycratic and is faced by all the rms. The latter component intends to capture the proportion of the variance in EPS growth that is common to FTSE 100 and 30 other companies in the sample. These two components should be able to explain the spread in the EPS-Growth which is the di¤erence between the maximum and the minimum EPS growth that is forecasted by the analysts for each rm Equation (7) summarizes this and shows that the analysts predicted spread in EPS-growth, the left-hand-side, is equal to the sum of a rm specic standarddeviation of EPS-Growth, and the proportion of a rms standard deviation that is marked-up by
The variable scales up rms own standard deviation by an amount that captures shocks common to all the rms. We estimate by summing over for all rms the ratios of the EPS growth spread in, + 1, and the expectational error in rms EPS growth that occurred in period, . Intuitively, this ratio captures the fraction in predicted EPS-growth spreads that is left once the most recent surprises in EPS growth have been accounted for. Another way of interpreting is that it is the fraction in analysts predicted EPS-growth spread that is not related to the very recent rms performance but something else. In order to get a standardized measure of, , we take the root squared sum of for all the 130 rms in our sample (see second line in Equation (7)).
where = v u u t X Ã ( ) ¡ ( ) expectational error in EPS growth in rm at ! Once we have computed, , we can use the data on the spread in EPS growth in + 1 to recover the for the rm from Equation (7) . There is one last matter that needs explaining and that is the presence of p 3 in Equation (7). We explain that now. Because we are only interested in what would happen in the three period during which the conditions on options are being examined the variance in EPS-Growth is computed as the variance in the three-year average expected growth in EPS, i.e., the variance of the average of 1 2 3. . Thus, µ 1 + 2 + 3 3 ¶ = 1 9 ( + + )
Now, making the assumption that the variance in EPS growth across years is constant implies that cross covariances can be taken to be equal to one another. Hence,
However, we nd no compelling reason why expectational errors in EPS-growth back in time would a¤ect current expectational errors. Indeed, the correlations in expectational errors in EPS growth between 2001 and 2002 was found to be -0.02. This led us to assume in equation (9) the correlation, , to be zero. This assumption simplies our task of computing the variance and implies that
The right-hand-side of Equation (10) is the standard deviation that is referred to in Equation (7). Note that in calculating the standard deviations for each rm in Equation (7) we only use the latest expectational errors in EPS-growth that are available at the time of share option grant and also one year forecasts in EPS-growth spread. This is so as shorter forecasts and the latest data on the expectational errors in EPS-growth give a realistic view of what could be expected of the rms. We now have all the ingredients to calculate the probabilities from Equation (5). In Figure 1 we present a distribution of the probabilities and Table 3 reports basic statistics on the probabilities. The probabilities in Figure 1 and Table 3 are the average of the probabilities we obtain from three di¤erent proxies of the three-year-average-expected growth of EPS, ¹ we used in the Equation (4). Out of the 130 rms, 83 rms exclusively use the EPS-growth condition to incentivize the share options awards. The concentration of the probabilities is in the region of 40-50%. Indeed, 60 out of 83 rms set EPS growth targets with an average probability of 45% of hitting the EPS growth target ( see Table 3 ). Thus, for the majority of the CEOs given current information there is about 50% chance of being successful given current information. There are only three rms in the sample with toughness in EPS growth such that the probabilities of hitting the target is below 10%.
The interesting question these probabilities raise is whether or not they are related to company characteristics such as the composition of the remcoms, the independence of the remcoms, the base salaries of the CEO and other variables. In the next section we examine the relationship between the probabilities and these charateristics.
Econometric Model and Results
In this section we set up a linear regression model to nd out if company fundamentals inuence the toughness of EPS-growth targets. We use the following regression model
where and denote the probability of hitting EPS-growth target for the rm using the average three-year expected growth and a vector of explanatory variables respectively. The error term, is assumed to be normally distributed. Before we present the results of our regression, in Table 6 (in the Appendix) a correlation matrix of the fundamental variables we use in the regressions is presented. Generally, all the varaibles are weakly correlated with one another, thus our regressions should not su¤er form collinearity and are also independent. One exception is that CEO-salary appears to be postively correlated with the remcom-chair salary and the average salary of members of the remcom. Though, these correlations are not high enough to be cause for concern. Table 4 . below presents the results we obtained from the regressions using di¤erent probabilities. Table 4 . Regression Results for Equation (11 Table 4 we report the results of the regression on Equation(11). We use 9 fundamental variables which we believe should be associated with toughness of the EPS-Growth target, i.e. our probabilities. The regressors are based on the various meaures of the expected three-year EPS-growth we discussed earlier see Equation (6) . Note that our results are not a¤ected by the choice of the probability measure.
The rst explanatory variable used to explain the toughness of targets is the governance of remcom which is a binary variable and it is set to one when the chairman of the company is part of the remcom and zero otherwise. Our a priori belief is that members of remcom can set targets for awards more freely in the absence of the chairman. Our results suggest a negative relationship between the target toughness and remcoms independence. Thus, the presence of the chairman does imply softer targets. Although the negative coe¢cient is not large but it is signicant at 10 % and this is an encouraging result given our small sample size.
The second variable we use is the number of non-executive directors that sit in the remcom. Does it matter to have a bigger remcom for the toughness of the targets? The coe¢cient of the variable remcom membership is negative in Table  4 implying that companies with a bigger remcom set tougher targets. However, this coe¢cient is small but signicant at 10%. This result in a way justies the government guidelines that set the minimum number of non-exectuive directors in a remcom to be three.
The third and fourth variables are the salaries of the chairs of remcoms and the average salary of the members of the remcom (other than the chair). A priori, higher salaries for the members of the committee would incentivise the remcom to do a better job in setting the appropriate targets for the companies CEOs. Our results suggest that the coe¢cients on Remcom Chair-Salary and Average Remcom Salary are negative as we expected. Although both the coe¢cients are small, the former is signicant at 10% but the latter is highly insignicant Similarly, the coe¢cient on CEOs tenure, our fth variable, suggest that CEOs with longer tenure are set tougher targets yet this relationship is too weak and insignicant.
We also include as regressors the current salary of CEOs and the proportion of base pay out of total pay of the CEO. In both cases we expect that if either the base salary or the proportion of the base salary with respect to total pay is generous then the targets for the long term pay targets ought to be tougher. Thus, the idea is that remcoms which are generous in terms of xed pay are tougher for long-term rewards. We nd that there is indeed a negative relationship between target hardness and proportion of base salary to total pay and it is signicant at 10% though the coe¢cient is small. This is an encouraging result. However, contrary to our expectations, we found a positive but insignicant relationship between targets toughness and the CEO salary.
Our eigth and ninth variables are CEO notice periods and Executive Advice both of which are binary variables. The notice period is a binary variable and equal to one when the notice period is one year and zero otherwise. The executive advice variable is also binary and is set one when the remcoms take the CEOs advice in setting pay levels and targets for company executives and zero otherwise. For the former variable we expect that a combination of shorter notice periods and harder targets would incentivize the CEOs in the right direction (Kay and Silberston (1995) ). Indeed, the coe¢cient of the variable " CEO Notice Period" turns out as negative and signicant at 10%. This result justies the government recommendation of favouring shorter notice periods. For the latter variable we expect that the intervention by the CEOs in the remcoms decisions make targets softer for long-term pay in that it may also pave the path for easier targets for themselves mself. Though the coe¢cient on the variable Executive Advice is unexpectedly negative but it is weak and highly insignicant.
The majority of the results we have obtained are in the right direction however lack strength, as it is clear from our F-test. However, the fact that most results were individually signicant at 10% is encouraging. The weak association between the target toughness and company fundamental can either be down to the sample size and/or the willingness and perhaps the ability of the remcoms to serve the company executive with challenging targets.
The regressions we presented in Table 4 may su¤er from selection bias in that in our sample of 130 rms we selected 30 companies from FTSE 350 which exclusively use the EPS-Growth target for the share-options. As a result the sample can be biased. In the next section we present the above results controlling the selection bias.
Model without Selection Bias.
In this section we apply the two step Heckman procedure in (Heckman 1979) to see if selectivity in terms of rms using earnings per share conditions inuences the results. We linked our data from the FTSE1000 with data from company accounts and constructed the following measures as inuences on selection: (a) capital to market cap, (b) wage bill to market cap, (c) debt to market cap. We also experimented with several other selection measures. Capital to market cap was the most signicant. The reason why we believe this variables a¤ects the selection of the EPS-growth but not the probabilities is that the need for large amounts of capital requires that large institutional investors be attracted to the rm. One way of acheiving this is to use exclusively the EPS targets which are fully geard to delivering returns on shares. However, these investors do not specify that the targets should depend on capital-market-cap ratio since there is no a priori reason to expect EPS target di¤culty should depend on capital-market-cap and other ratios. However, in the end our results as shown in Table 5 are broadly consistent with those reported earlier. In particular, the variables such as Remcom Gevernance, Remcom Chair Salary, CEO Salary and % of Fixed Salary which are only signicant at 10% after controlling for selection bias. Also the coe¢cient on the inverse Mills Ratio in all three regressions is not statistically signicant.
Although there may be other accounting and economic measures which inuence which companies use EPS targets, we were unable to nd ones which signicantly ( below 5% level) impacted on the results. 
Conclusions
A special feature of UK executive pay is the heavy reliance on performance conditions. This heavy reliance on performance conditions has come through successive generations of ABI guidelines as well as corporate governance reports by government. This paper computes the probabilities of meeting performance conditions and how much these vary across rms. Using remuneration report data and analyst forecasts, we also consider the determinants of our derived probabilities.
Our main ndings are that there is not that much cross-company variation in how tough performance conditions are, though there are some outliers. We also nd that the probability of meeting the target depends on certain fundamental variables such as number of non-executive directors, salaries of the chairs of the remuneration committees, CEO tenure, CEO base pay and CEO notice periods. While most of the variables have the sign as expected from our a priori beliefs and some are statistically signicant at 10%, the size of the coe¢cients tend to be quite small. We examine whether these statistical relations appear to be driven by selectivity e¤ects in terms of which companies use earnings per share targets and at least as we can tell from available data, there does not appear to be such statistical bias. Overall, our results provide some support that good corporate governance leads to tougher targets on CEOs but at the same time the weakness of these links suggests that there is still much room for improvement. Table 6 . Correlation Matrix
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